报告人简介：
牛保庄，华南理工大学工商必赢线路检测中心教授，博导，教育部“青年长江学者”建议人选，获聘广东省"青年珠江学者"。本、硕、博分别毕业于山东大学、华南理工大学和香港理工大学。目前已在运营管理领域发表顶级期刊论文7篇，包括Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 1篇，Production and Operations Management 3篇，Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 3篇，另有23篇文章发表在EJOR, Omega等知名期刊。社会兼职包括广东省政协委员、民革中央妇青委委员、民革广东省经济委员会副主任，省委委员。学术兼职包括中国系统工程学会智能制造系统工程专委会委员，农业系统工程专委会常务理事，中国物流教指委青工组副组长等。MSOM, POM, TRB等20 余种重要期刊审稿人。获广东省哲学社会科学优秀成果二等奖(排名第1)，中国决策科学"青年科技奖"，首届中国随机服务与运作管理“青年学者奖”等多个奖项。先后入选中山大学、华南理工大学杰出人才引进计划、广东省优秀青年教师、广东省千百十人才工程等。
报告简介：
In today's increasingly interconnected world, co-opetition due to the introduction of dual sourcing (for alternative supplier) and dual channel (for alternative profit) has emerged as a new business practice among the high-tech firms. The boundaries between cooperation and competition have been becoming vague, where rivals engage in collaborative activities. This study develops an analytical model to investigate the dual sourcing decision of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in the presence of a competitive supplier (i.e. frenemy) as well as a non-competitive supplier who nevertheless suffers from unreliable production technology. We also investigate the competitive supplier's dual channel decision if it prefers operating both component-selling business and self-branded business. We find that the OEM always prefers supplier diversification by engaging the additional non-competitive supplier although the latter experiences the yield uncertainty problem. Further, we show that the non-competitive supplier's expected profit is unimodal in its production technology level in the dual sourcing scenario. This result suggests that the non-competitive supplier may not have incentives to further improve its production technology once it reaches a threshold. Finally, we investigate the credibility of competitive supplier's threat to stop supplying the components to OEM as a response of OEM's engagement of a new supplier. We show that the termination of component-selling business by competitive supplier is a non-credible threat to prevent OEM seeking the alternative supplier.
